Douglas even refers to a "success cosmology" as prevailing in societies of the type in question. Using the example of Melanesian societies that are built around a kind of individual called the "Big Man," she states:
Everyone else depends on the Big Man for their livelihood and security. He creates the political and ritual framework in which ordinary men can work out their cycles, patterns of reciprocal exchanges in grander and granderpatterns. His glory enhances the lustre of theirs. He creates largescale local alliances, controls violence, settles disputes. He does it all by generosity, hard work, skillful manipulation of the rules of feastgiving and compensation.
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Some inevitably experience the ladder of success as something oppressive; for the success cosmology is built on an egalitarian principle that can never favor more than a small minority. Its survival, Douglas concludes, depends on recurrent millenarian outbreaks, such as those of the so-called "Melanesian cargo cults." 6 To explain this, I must make brief reference to her fourth type: weak group and grid.
Those who come to experience the social grid as oppressive give expression to their experience of social marginality by means of a "weak group, weak grid" type of cosmology. They reject all rules and differentiations, embrace the idea of an imminent benign unstructured cosmos, and stress ecstatic or even frenzied behavior in acting out, or attempting to bring in, the millennium. Obviously, neither they nor their cosmology can last for long. Thus, as already noted, the "weak group, weak grid" social and cosmological type frequently exists as a temporary negative reaction to the grid-oriented one.
THE ELITE-POPULAR DIVISION IN THE CHINESE CASE
Even before I present any evidence, some will sense that correlations exist, on the one hand, between Douglas' grid-oriented cosmology and the world view of traditional China's literati elite and, on the other hand, between her grouporiented cosmology and aspects of Chinese popular religion. The value of these correlations will be small, however, if the elite-popular division itself is essentially flawed or, perhaps, irrelevant to the Chinese case.
When the shortcomings of a prevailing theory become evident, there is a tendency for scholars to reject it using the same kind of enthusiasm with which they once embraced it I consider this a majorreason for recent attacks on the elitepopular division, especially Redfield's great tradition versus little tradition version of this division. I believe it will weather the current storm over its shortcomings and re-emerge in strengthened form.
What are its shortcomings? First, of course, a shortcoming is inherent in its dichotomous nature. For any dichotomy can lead us to see reality in simple black and white, rather than in all its color and complexity. But this is not a fatal flaw; for as we will see later, the elite-popular division is susceptible to refinements that can make it applicable to complex cultural wholes. Second, a necessary shortcoming of any particular version of die elite-popular division derived from the study of one culture is that it may not be applicable to another culture, at least not without extensive modification. This has been an especially serious concern of China scholars, since most theory in this area was developed in ignorance of the Chinese situation. Some China scholars, such as G. William Skinner, for example, has reacted by declaring all such theory irrelevant to the Chinese case.
Two decades ago, amidst rapid growth of interest in peasant societies, Skinner wrote a biting critique of the supposedly universal models then in vogue.
These included Redfield's great tradition/little tradition model as well as Eric
Wolf's open community/closed community model. In fact, his article, titled "Chinese Peasants and die Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," was aimed primarily at Wolf's model and only secondarily at Redfield's.
7 Nevertheless, the lessons to be learned from his article apply to any effort to contrast elite and popular culture in China.
Skinner gave us several good reasons to accept his opinion that "the whole body of inherited anthropological wisdom concerning peasantries seems somehow alien and irrelevant to students of Chinese society." 8 First, traditional Chinese society was multi-leveled, not two-leveled. Second, there was a signifi-cant degree of mobility along both the political and economic tracks out of peasant communities upward into higher socio-economic levels. Third, upward movement did not estrange one from one 9 s village past because of a moral orientation in which loyalty to local origins was highly valued. For these reasons, homogenization of culture was the rule; and the closure of local peasant communities to outside influence was an exception realized only during the chaos of dynastic decline. Conversely, periods of relative peace and prosperity during the dynastic cycle guaranteed homogenization of culture for reasons just given. To quote Skinner:
Thus were peasants, in the context of their wider community, exposed to diverse customs, alien values, and exogenous norms-elements originating not only in other communities like their own but also in cities, elements drawn not only from other little traditions but also from the great tradition of the imperial elite.
Journal of Chinese Religions
"consciousness," he argues that the consciousness of members in each group is determined by their position in two distinguishable but interrelated systems: ( 1 ) the structure of dominance and (2) The highest and lowest groups are still the familiar literati officials and common peasants, now known as the "classically educated/legally privileged" and the "illiterate/dependent" However-and this is Johnson's key message-we must investigate the role of several in-between groups before we will have a complete picture of the elite-popular continuum in traditional Chinese culture.
For those of us interested in the religious dimension of Chinese culture, Johnson's multi-leveled model is particularly valuable. For, as borne out by several articles in the same volume where we find Johnson's piece (Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, ed. Johnson, et al.), the majority of key figures on the religious scene-from Taoist priests and Buddhist monks to geomancers and sectarian leaders-belonged to Johnson's in-between groups.
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More important for present purposes, Johnson makes good use of crosscultural theory about elite and popular culture and refines it in a way that accords with the complex cultural situation of traditional China. If anything, he implicitly disavows any notion of the homogenization of culture and seems bent on giving us tools to identify the particular version of Chinese culture that corresponded to each particular socio-pultural group. In his concluding remarks, we find the following two statements:
In short, the members of each group defined above had a characteristic sense of where they stood in the great structure of dominance and subordination, and also a distinctive style in which they expressed the ideology that reflected that sense... [And] as a system of thought, or a religious revelation, or any other creation of the human verbal imagination, spread through Chinese society, it must have come to exist in a number of versions, each produced by and for an important socio-cultural group. by describing a certain number of corpora (sets of texts, gestures, and beliefs". 14 His key example concerns the livrets bleus of 17th century France, which some had considered to typify the French popular culture of that period after studying the content and distribution of this type of text. Chartier argues it is possible that "the livrets bleus did not have a specific public but constituted reading matter for different social groups, each approaching it in ways ranging from a basic deciphering of signs to fluent reading."
15 Although his argument incorporates some new evidence, its most important feature is methodological. One could almost consider it a "paradigm shift" Consider this statement: I argue that it is pointless to try to identify popular culture by some supposedly specific distribution of cultural objects. Their distribution is always more complex than it might seem at first glance, as are their appropriations by groups and individuals. A sociology of distribution implying that the classification of professional groups corresponds with a classification of cultural products and practices can no longer be accepted uncritically. It is clear that the relation of appropriation to texts or behavior in a given society may be a more distinctive factor than how texts and behavior are distributed. The "popular" cannot be found readymade in a set of texts that merely require to be identified and listed; above all, the popular qualifies a kind of relation, a way of using cultural products such as legitimate ideas and attitudes. Such an argument evidently changes the work of historians, because it implies identifying and distinguishing not cultural sets defined as "popular" but rather the specific ways in which such cultural sets are appropriated."
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Will we have to wait years before this new paradigm has an impact on the study of Chinese religion? Fortunately not; we already have an excellent example in Robert Weiler, Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion.
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Weller's book is based on recent field work in Sanxia Township, Taiwan, as well as on historical research reaching back into 19th century Taiwan. Although Weiler presents a fairly complete picture of Chinese religion in Sanxia, his focus is on one ritual activity, the seventh month ghost-feeding, or Universal Salvation, rites. In fact, to be more specific, it is on what he calls the "ritual media" involved. His main point is that, while all of Sanxia's social groups participate in the rites, each has a different interpretation of the ritual media they confront He resists putting the label "popular* ' on the ghost feeding rites for the same reason that Chartier resists putting it on 17th century livrets bleus. It is not the content of the cultural object that is "popular." It is a certain "style of interpretation" of the cultural object that can be labeled "popular." Moreover, the style of interpretation that Weiler calls the "popular tradition" is not uncritically opposed to an "elite tradition" within a two-level model. Instead, he contrasts it with five other styles of interpretation, those of Buddhism, Taoism, the modem elite, the premodem state cult, and the five-element system. 18 Weiler thus goes beyond a simple elite-popular dichotomy to a multi-tradition model. At the same time, he abandons the type of paradigm that seeks a version of culture (a "tradition") in the cultural objects of a certain socio-cultural group, using a paradigm that seeks it in a group's style of appropriating ("interpreting") cultural objects that are shared with other groups.
Is David Johnson's nine group picture of traditional Chinese society compatible with the type of paradigm to which Chartier and Weiler have moved? Of course it is. Moreover, one may sometimes be on safe ground assuming that certain cultural objects are a more or less unique repository of the values of a certain socio-cultural group, such as the state documents written by literati officials in Johnson's highest group. Nevertheless, Chartier and Weiler are wise to encourage us to focus on the interpretive framework that a socio-cultural group brings to its encounter with particular cultural objects, regardless of whether they turn out to be uniquely linked with that group or widely shared with other groups.
But what does it mean to shift our focus from the content of cultural objects supposedly linked with a group to the group's interpretive framework? After all, cultural objects will remain our key sources of information, even if we begin to pay more attention to how such objects are differently interpreted by different groups. And only the anthropologist studying a contemporary society will be able actually to observe how members of different groups interpret shared cultural objects. Now the question is: How does Mary Douglas' model help us out of this quandary? First of all, its two variables, grid and group, are formal constructs. Using them places the emphasis squarely on structure, not content; on interpretive frameworks, not cultural objects. Secondly, it allows us to predict from the study of a group's social experience, even before we know what cultural objects it appropriates, the )b>z¿ of interpretive framework it is likely to adopt, atleast within the limited range of the variables grid and group.
Of course, this second benefit of Douglas' model accrues to us only if we can, in fact, gain access to the social experience of a group. This becomes a crucial issue as we attempt to deal with the social experience and cosmology of groups at the poles of the elite-popular continuum in traditional Chinese society, Johnson's highest and lowest groups. For, as is so often noted, the literate and • privileged members of a society leave a far more detailed record of their lives than do their peasant counterparts. system (such as we find in the Yi-jing) or, conversely, a human medium who is empowered by the spirit of an anthropomorphic deity that has entered his or her body; 20 (3) ancestral ritual, with its motivations, on the one hand, in the desire to celebrate the continuity of an extensive spatial and temporal network of familial influence and, on the other hand, in the desire to propitiate isolated and potentially malevolent spirits; 21 and (4) rites of felicity for gods, sages, or other honored personages which, while similar in most respects, either minimize or maximize the role of bloody sacrifices, entranced mediums who mutilate their bodies, and ecstatic outbursts of emotion.
GRID AND GROUP IN CHINESE RELIGIOUS CULTURE
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Each of these pairs of opposing interpretations can be explored beneficially using the grid/group model. But in this essay certain limits must be set. The emphasis here will be on bodies: human individual and social entities. Moreover, the nature of opposing interpretations will be exhibited in an intensified way by comparing the social experience and cosmology of literati men and peasant women.
As far as I know, opposing interpretations of the nature and processes of the female body have not been among typical examples of the elite-popular division in Chinese culture. In fact, only during the last couple of decades has the Chinese case in this area gained the attention of social scientists. Initially, these were anthropologists interested in the social and symbolic import of ritual observances related to menstruation, childbirth, and related matters. generally conform to the prevailing crosscultural theory that at least part of the reason why menstrual and birth discharges are defined as ritually defiling, or worse, is because they axe symbolically linked with social disorder. In Douglas' model, of course, they become so linked because the body as a bounded system is a perfect symbol for the inviolable wholeness of a social group.
For example, describing the situation of a young woman at menarche in rural Taiwan, Margery Wolf writes:
She discovers that her body is a source of filth that can endanger others as well as herself. She may not enter a temple during her menses, for her unclean state would anger the gods, perhaps to the point of causing illness to strike her in revenge. A menstruating woman cannot attend the annual firewalking lest her presence cause the men who walk on the coals to burn their feet. Also, as all accounts agree, not only is postpartum discharge a more potent source of ritual pollution than menstrual blood, and the placenta an object that must be disposed of carefully at some distance from the home, but both mother and child must spend a month in seclusion, undergoing purification through a variety of hygienic, dietary, and ritual observances.
None 
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Interestingly, this model led us as surely to female anxiety about menstruation as did popular views that a menstruating woman would offend the gods, although for different reasons. The popular views were grounded in a set of beliefs about -bodily pollution that attributed dangerous negative powers to a woman's menstrual discharge. By contrast, the physician's model of a woman's pathology was grounded in a set of beliefs in which her body was seen as operating, like society and the cosmos, according to principles of interrelatedness, cyclicity, and harmonious cooperation. What was the same in both contexts was that men considered women uniquely prone to certain physical problems, just as they saw them as a special source of social problems.
In a second article, "Concepts of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Infancy in Ch'ing Dynasty China," Fürth draws an even broader conclusion in this regard, namely, that elite medical texts and popular religion shared a common value system within which women were defined, physically, as the "sickly sex" and, sexually, as a danger to themselves and others. To be specific, she concludes that "the high medical tradition" in part "represents a rationalization of pollution beliefs." To wit:
Ritual avoidances are reinterpreted as health precautions: the disposal of the *Ibid., 51. placenta protects the child's health; the month's seclusion aids maternal recovery; birth tonics, ritual baths, and cleansings are medicines against childhood disease; and, medically speaking, fetal poison is a susceptibility to contagion.
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While Furth's use of the concept "rationalization" may be adequate to explain the fact that a difference existed between the two styles of interpretation, popular and elite, it is not adequate to explain the nature of this difference. To explain its nature, we need to discover the interpretive frameworks that laid beneath the opposing uses of common symbolic resources by the literati men who wrote medical texts and the peasant women who observed popular ritual avoidances. Following Douglas' model, the process of discovery incorporates the investigation of social experience as well as cosmology.
Literati Social Experience and the Philosophy of Organism
The hierarchical organicistic world view of traditional China's literati, their "bureaucratized Heaven," is known too well to require any detailed exposition here. However, it is necessary to comment on the appropriateness of the metaphor of "organism" to describe this cosmology both on its own terms and with reference to Douglas' model. Douglas' name has become linked with the view that the primary symbolic use of the body is to express social and cosmic boundedness. Unfortunate as this is, from my viewpoint, it is largely her own fault. Although she is aware that the symbolic potential of the body is rich and varied, she nevertheless concludes that, when "grid" dominates social experience, "the human body is inevitably less cogent as a symbol of society." 29 Saying this, she forgets that the body is not only a bounded system, it is also an organism: a complex system of interrelated parts, each in some way mirroring the whole yet serving a unique function necessary for the whole's survival. In other words, the body viewed as an organism is a perfectly cogent symbol for a social network with rules that carefully articulate interactions within a group yet allow for fluid The body is so viewed in the medical texts Fürth has studied, and cosmological implications of this have already been mentioned. As for cosmology itself, Joseph Needham, who was probably first to identify the cosmology in question as a "philosophy of organism," has documented a variety of ways in which the human body was used in China to represent reality in two larger forms: the state and the universe. He termed one usage the "state-analogy," and the other the "universe-analogy."
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The organicistic quality of the literati cosmology is a feature that has made it appear "modem" or even "secular" to many. Evenmoreimportantin this regard, however, are the features which it lacks, but which characterize a group-oriented cosmology: personal divinity, as opposed to nonpersonal self-regulating processes; a cosmic battle between Good and Evil, as opposed to harmonious cooperation between cosmic forces; and fixed metaphysical dualisms, as opposed to complementary opposites of the yin and yang type. Whether or not, lacking these features, the literati cosmology was in fact nonreligious is here beside the point. Our interest lies in the kind of social experience in which its grid-oriented, apparently nonreligious nature was rooted. We can discuss this experience in • three areas: official life, local community life, and family life.
We can cover literati experience at the level of official life by treating, first, the path to official status and, second, a key example of "grid" features in official behavior. Those who have studied the system of examinations and appointments that prevailed in late imperial China, including E. A. Kracke, Jr., Chung-li Chang, and Ping-ti Ho, have shared a common question: What degree of social mobility did the system allow? 31 This is also an important question for us because mobility is an aspect of social experience that should accompany Douglas' grid-oriented "success cosmology". At the very least, Douglas' dictum that a success cosmology is built on an egalitarian principle that can never favor more than a small minority applies to the Chinese case as described by Kracke, Ho, and Chang, who cover, respectively, the Song, Ming-Qing, and late Qing periods. To quote Chang for example:
If there was not equality in the examination system, there was a general belief in the "spirit of equality," and this belief together with the fact that some social mobility did exist helped to stabilize the society and maintain the status quo.
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The three authors cover different periods and offer slightly different views about the degree of social mobility that existed. Nonetheless, they agree that China's official class was not a self-perpetuating aristocracy, they give much evidence of both upward and downward mobility along the Chinese ladder of success, and they stress that keen competition remained a dominant feature of the system. Ho gives the most optimistic assessment of the system where social mobility is concerned, and his views on downward mobility, in particular, help us to imagine the nature of literati social experience in late imperial China. He states:
Long-range downward mobility of high-status families could take place for any of the following factors: failure to provide children with a proper education, the competitive nature of the examination system which was based in the main on merit rather than on family status, the limited yin [hereditary] privilege of high officials, the mode of life and cultural expressions of the leisured class, and the progressive dilution of wealth due to the absence of primogeniture.
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Thus, while China's future officials were often sons of present officials who, statistically, had some advantage over others, their concern was with the keenness of competition rather than with statistical advantage, and their experience was conditioned by a system that was as anxiety producing as it was complex and hierarchical.
Turning from competition for official status to the nature of official life ^hang.p. 187.
^Ho.p.lóS.
itself, we see that anxiety over status and security did not disappear when one possessed the highest degree that the examination system offered (jin-shi) and attained an official post Despite their class status, individual officials were subject to continual scrutiny, possible demotion or expulsion, and intermittent purges. In the words of Etienne Balazs: 'The first thing that strikes one about this stratum is the precarious position of its members individually, contrasted with their continuous existence as a social class."
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There was also much else about official life that allows us to call it gridoriented. The ranks and functions of officials were carefully delineated; they participated in decision making and exercised power according to carefully stipulated rules; they expressed themselves in official documents that reflected a keen concern for ranks and rules; and they held ceremonies in which they consciously acted out their organically conceived, concentric, and hierarchical world view. While examples could be given in any of the areas just listed, the last one interests me most In fact, it was while studying the ritual behavior of Chinese officials that the grid-oriented nature of their world view and social experience first impressed itself on me.
The object of my research, Qing Dynasty imperial audience ritual, provides -a striking example of how officials experienced their public world as a complexly ordered grid. Imperial audience ritual not only provided the context for official interactions with the emperor but also established the model for official meetings at lower levels of government. Moreover, this kind of ritual was not only performed on purely ritual occasions, it was also performed on occasions involving governmental affairs. In other words there were both "ceremonial" and "business" audiences.
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The most fundamental as well as grandiose example of imperial audience ritual was the Grand Audience (da-chao) held annual on each of the "three great 
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The focus of the arrangement thus described was the Imperial Dragon Throne inside the Hall of Supreme Harmony. Each participant in the rite stood at a distance from this sacred center appropriate to his geographical, political, or familial relationship to the emperor. Moreover, the idea that the human social order replicated a natural hierarchical order was expressed by the fact that the emperor represented the dragon by his attire, while all officials had on their robes the creatures that stood for their specific ranks (animals on military robes, and birds on civil ones).
While this ceremony was a highly formalized and idealized version of the grid-oriented public world of Chinese officials, it was paralleled by literati social experience of various kinds both in and outside official life. This meant, among other things, that it provided an experience that reinforced the grid-oriented world view to which an official had become accustomed in working his way up the ladder of success toward official life.
Furthermore, the experience he had in working for a place in the imperial bureaucracy was paralleled by that at the level of the local community, to which With regard to the family, a Uteratus would have been among those in Chinese society most likely to experience life in the stereotypical Chinese family: large, complex, hierarchical, and determining individual identity by means of dyadic relationships in which the ideal of filial behavior was to be realized. Of course, this reinforced the grid-oriented nature of his social experience at the levels of community and official life, even though his family/lineage identity was * perhaps the strongest "group" feature of his social experience. For, while identification with the family group as such was important, it was not a prime consideration, as in Japan, for example. 38 It is therefore interesting that Douglas' model predicts that this difference between Chinese and Japanese society would be accompanied by a greater general emphasis on ritual purity in Japanese religion. correlate with their concern over such sources of ritual pollution as menstrual discharge. We can proceed by commenting on the extent to which they were removed from the strong "grid" dimension of literati social experience at its various levels: national bureaucracy, local community, and family. Where the national bureaucracy was concerned, peasant women, along with their upper class counterparts, lacked the very opportunity to compete for a role. If their low class status meant anything, it was that even their husbands and other male relatives were probably estranged from official life. In other words, they had no direct experience of official life. Any "experience" they did have of it was vicarious, through novels, plays, and hearsay.
Social Experience and Cosmological Views of Peasant
Turning to the local level, one reason why a woman's awareness of the actualities of official life was limited was that her world was so "bounded," in the literal as well as in Douglas' more figurative sense, whether its boundaries were those of a market region, a village, or her own household. Here again there was little difference between the peasant and upper class woman, except that the "world" of the latter may have been even more bounded than that of the former. Hui-chen Wang Liu's fascinating study of clan rules from Qing period genealogies provides many interesting details about customs related to the seclusion of women from affluent families. Perhaps most interesting is the fact that the prohibited out of home activity mentioned most often was visiting temples, and it was an activity condemned specifically because it prevailed "among ordinary people." 39 The general picture presented by Hui-chen Wang Liu shows, in fact, that the situation in late imperial China paralleled that which existed elsewhere in the traditional world. One way a family could establish and maintain high social status was by preserving the "purity" of its women through seclusion. Of course, due to the tendency of peasant families to imitate elite ones, Chinese peasants also expressed their concerns for female "purity" by practicing seclusion, though less strictly, together with the aforementioned ritual practices. The result was that peasant women were even more limited in their social contacts outside the home and village than their male relatives.
A woman may have been linked through her husband to local economic or political networks, but, assuming he was also poor and illiterate, these would not have been of any significant scale. If her husband did "experience" them, it was probably from the side on which one sees an oppressive grid rather than a ladder of success. As for her own case, based on the study of contemporary rural Chinese society, the "networks" to which she belonged were probably limited to her own kind: village women. 40 In fact, in this instance, we are no longer dealing with "networks" inthesenseof social units with a predominance of grid elements. On the contrary, we are dealing with local social units in which identification with the group was a prime consideration and for which there were few carefully articulated rules of social interaction.
Turning, finally, to the social experience of the peasant woman within her own family, we have the greatest likelihood of finding her in a grid-oriented social world. For even a woman secluded at home would experience "grid" elements in her family life, where sex and age distinctions provided the basis for differential treatment in human relations. Nonetheless, her experience could lack such elements precisely to the degree that it did not match up to the stereotypical ideal of the large and complex Chinese family. And, as has become obvious in recent decades to students of the Chinese family, this ideal was rarely actualized within the social and economic situation of Chinese peasants. 41 It is therefore reasonable • to assert that even the family life of a peasant woman and her husband, when compared to that of their literati counterparts, was relatively lacking in grid elements. Generally, the former lived in a small household composed only of parents, their children, and possibly their parents or unmarried brothers and sisters; the latter lived in a large household, which definitely included the family members just mentioned as well as married brothers and their families, probably other relatives, and perhaps servants and concubines.
Moreover, since the peasant woman is of special concern here, we must also consider whether or not she was even further removed than her husband from a grid-oriented family experience, and her sense of self therefore even further defined by group identity rather than by roles played within social networks. Patriarchal, patrynomic, patrilineal and patriarchal, the Chinese family system was designed to provide men rather than women with social roles. Thus, despite the complexities of Chinese kinship, the standard for of reference to a woman used only a family name. She was "woman Wang" (Wang-shi) or "woman Lin" (Linshi). A woman received her identity through her links with men: first her father, then her husband, and finally her sons. According to one theory, because she was bom into one male lineage and would be married into another, she never fit comfortably and unambiguously anywhere in the kinship system. 42 As a result, she experienced herself as an anomalous entity and, especially after marriage, as someone suspected of divided loyalties. Faced with this situation, she had a need to identify strongly with her husband's family or, perhaps, with an even more narrowly defined social unit Thinking along these lines, Margery Wolf proposed her well known theory of the uterine family. In simple form, her theory is that, since the male oriented Chinese kinship system is so irrelevant to a woman!s own experience, she willy nilly creates her own "family." Inherwords: "The uterine family... has no public existence, and appears almost as a response to the traditional family organized in terms of male ideology." 43 A woman creates the uterine family, physically, by giving birth to children and, psychologically, be recreating her warm memories of the security of the family her mother created. Lacking authority and property rights, she uses her role as mother to build deep bonds between herself and her children, forming a unit within the larger family that develops and defends its own integrity and interests. This social unit quite obviously has more "group" than "grid" features. It not only lacks public existence, explains Wolf, it has no ideology and no formal structure. She states: "It is built out of sentiments and loyalties that die with its members, but it is no less real for all that" 44 Its reality as a dimension of a woman's social experience is especially notable. For, according to Wolf, the uterine family is important precisely at the level of lived experience, rather than at the level of abstract clan rules or formal kinship 42 
